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Introduction
One of the often noted traits of elections in the "third-wave" democracies is the high level of uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006: 221), a consequence of low levels of party system institutionalization, high electoral volatility, the shallow anchoring of the vote in ideological or partisan predispositions and the prevalence of personalistic voting.
According to most of the literature, Portugal is not an exception to this pattern.
Individual voting behaviour is weakly explained by stable social cleavages and electoral volatility has been extremely high ever since democratization in the 1970s (Gunther and Montero, 2001) . Affect towards party leaders has been shown to play an extremely strong role in voting choices (Lobo, 2006) . Positions on most issues -with the exception of the economy -play a modest and rather confusing role in electoral behaviour (Freire, 2007) . Although pre-election polls conducted in the week immediately before the elections seem to converge to relatively accurate results, those conducted few weeks or months before election day display wide divergences and fluctuations, suggesting a very late crystallization of the vote and large numbers of late deciders (Magalhães, 2005) . Accordingly, discussions and explanations of concrete election outcomes in Portugal typically place great stock in campaign events, media coverage, and leaders' traits and personalities (Lloyd-Jones, 2001; Salgado, 2007) .
All this, together with the inevitably small number of observations of democratic election outcomes, has probably served to dissuade scholars from attempting to devise models forecasting election results in recently established democracies. A look at the English-language literature on election forecasting in scientific journals reveals that, outside the United States where a vast literature on the subject has been published since the 1970s 1 only in cases such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany have such models been commonly proposed.
2 However, there are, prima facie, some reasons to believe that, among "third-wave" democracies, Portugal is perhaps one of the cases where attempts at election forecasting are more promising. On the one hand, from 1975 until today, already twelve general legislative elections have been conducted, providing a number of observations for analysis that, albeit very small, is in any case larger than in any other "third-wave" democracy. On the other hand, Portugal's party system, political institutions and structure of electoral competition have provided a contextual setting where the basic assumptions of most forecasting models are closely approximated. With a small number of effective parliamentary parties, 3 basic alternation in power between a large centre-right (the Social Democratic Party, PSD) and a large centre-left party (the Socialist Party, PS), a unicameral "arena" parliament, strong intraparty discipline and a president lacking effective veto-powers (Magalhães, 2003) , elections in Portugal do tend to exhibit the kind of "clarity of responsibility" and the direct link with the allocation of executive power that most forecasting models tend to assume.
In this article, we will suggest that, in fact, electoral outcomes in Portugal end up being quite predictable within a reasonably small margin of error. We formulate a vote function model to forecast the percent share obtained by the incumbent party in Portuguese general elections. We rely on the basic familiar notion in such forecast models: that the vote for the incumbent party is a function of "economics" and 1 For reviews, see, for example, Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992) , Lewis-Beck (2005), and Campbell (2008) . 2 For the UK, see, among many others, Whiteley (1979) , Mughan (1987) , the symposiums of papers published in Electoral Studies (vol. 23, issue 2) and the British Journal of Politics and International Relations (volume 7), and, more recently, Lebo and Norpoth (2008) and Whiteley (in press); for France, see, for example, Jérome and Jérome-Speziari (2004) and Lewis-Beck, Bélanger and Fauvelle-Aymar (2008) ; for Germany, see Norpoth and Gschwend (2003) . 3 In the twelve elections since 1975, the average "effective number of parliamentary parties" (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979 ) is 2.8.
"politics". However, we implement such notion in a somewhat less familiar way. On the one hand, without abandoning the idea that elections are, to some extent, a referendum on economic performance, we suggest that a non-linear specification of economic variables provides a more realistic approach to the way they actually play out on election outcomes. On the other hand, out of necessity, we end up replacing the common use of "government popularity" or "voting intention" survey-based indicators with other variables that, in fact, may actually end up bringing us closer to the political "fundamentals" in Portuguese electoral behaviour. One of those variables addresses a basic asymmetry between the left and the right of the Portuguese party system and the way that asymmetry entails a structural electoral punishment for centre-left governments. Another derives from the importance of the presidential office in the Portuguese "premier-presidential" brand of semi-presidentialism (Shugart, 2006) .
The model
Many (if not most) forecast models include some measure of lagged economic performance (Lewis-Beck, 2005) . There are good reasons to do the same in the case of Portugal. Research using aggregate survey data on aggregate government popularity or voting intentions suggests that voters are retrospective, punishing or rewarding government parties on the basis of past economic performance Veiga, 2004a and 2004b) . Studies based on the impact of actual economic conditions (rather than individual perceptions) on individual-level behaviour confirm this notion and show that Portugal is one of the European Union countries where the electoral effects of the economy are largest (van de Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007) . Finally, confirming existing theorization (Hibbs, 1977; Powell and Whitten, 1993) , not all leading economic indicators have the same effect on support for different government parties in Portugal:
while support for left-wing governments is mostly affected by unemployment, the effects of inflation are highest for right-wing ones (Veiga and Veiga, 2004a Furthermore, we submit that a non-linear transformation of the economic growth variable provides a more realistic approach to the way voting behaviour is likely to be affected by economic performance. If we had simply included the growth rate as an explanatory variable we were implicitly assuming that a change of the growth rate from 0 to 1 percent had the same impact as a change from 9 to 10 percent. This assumption is hardly justifiable. While the latter change is likely to make little difference in the public perception of very high economic growth rates, the former represents the difference between stagnation and (albeit low) growth. Thus, instead, we consider a non-linear monotonic transformation of the growth rate that allows the model to puff up the effect of growth rate changes when the growth rate is small. Let X t be the growth rate (in percentage terms) and max(X) the highest observed growth rate. Instead of X t , we use 4 Source: OECD. We also tried different lag structures. Predictably, the worst fit and a statistically insignificant coefficient was obtained with real yearly GDP growth measured up to the end of the quarter where the election took place. Lags of one or three quarters provided better results, but both worse than the two-quarter lag. 5 The other economic variable that is typically used in these kinds of studies is inflation. This variable was statistically not significant at the conventional levels.
the transformation
. In Figure 1 , we can observe the effect of this transformation for different values of , and assuming . 55 . 5 max X n one, when the growth rate is closer to zero, the impact of changes in the growth rate is magnified, and, therefore, and increase of the growth rate from 0 to 1 has a higher impact than an increase from 4 to 5. Instead of non-linear least squares and found the value of 0.633.
Figure 1 about here
Measures of economic performance tend to be combined, in the traditional political economy "Iowa Model", with some measure of how government has performed in other issues, more commonly, government popularity. In the Portuguese case, practical considerations exclude the use of such indicators from our model: there is no reliable government or prime-ministerial popularity poll data in Portugal before 1986 (Veiga and Veiga, 2004a) . Including such a variable in the model would thus lead us to lose five observations, another luxury we cannot afford.
It may be the case, however, that our inability to employ such an indicator ends up being a blessing in disguise. In the forecasting literature, there is considerable discussion about the adequate balance between purely predictive and explanatory goals.
While some see no reason not to employ the best available data to obtain the most accurate predictions such as, for example, results of trial-heat polls conducted close to the election (Campbell, 2000) others worry about near-tautological consequences of "placing the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation" (Lewis-Beck, 2005: 155) . This begs the question, however, of the extent to which the use of government popularity measures, even if lagged, as a predictor of the vote, is itself able to evade such near-tautology (van der Eijk, 2005) . In any case, regardless of how one stands in that particular debate, our practical inability to use popularity data creates, at the very least, an interesting challenge. If we are indeed able to produce reasonably accurate forecasts of the vote without resorting to poll data on popularity or voting intentions collected close to the elections themselves, having been forced to specify the "political" elements of the model in a different way, it is possible that we end up coming closer to the objective fundamentals of what explains elections results, rather than relying on attitudinal variables that may be themselves affected by those fundamentals.
We thus propose two political variables, one related to particular features of electoral competition and the party system in Portugal and another to he country's political institutions. First, an interesting result of studies using time-series data on aggregate government popularity and voting intention for the incumbent in Portugal is that, when all other economic and institutional factors are held constant, the coefficient for a "Socialist Party" dummy (with PSD as the reference category) is negative and significant Veiga 2004a and 2004b) . There are good reasons for such a pattern to emerge. Unlike what occurs in the right of the party system, where the voters' option between the PSD and the CDS-PP tends to be made mostly on the basis of strategic grounds and leader evaluations, choices within the left block are more strongly based in social and ideological grounds (Lobo, 2006) . 6 Furthermore, the Portuguese Socialist Party has, since its very inception, functioned as catch-all party and adopted centrist policies while in government. Unencumbered by links to the labour movement and involved in an enduring struggle against the Communist Party (PCP) first, for 6 For the distant origins of these patterns, see, for example, Gunther (2005) .
regime democratization and, later, for the liberalization of the a highly statist economy, the PS was often placed in a dilemma that, at the right, the PSD was able to avoid: its success in attracting and sustain a centrist electorate was often counterbalanced, following incumbencies, by losses to leftist parties (the PCP first, and later also to the newly created Leftist Block -BE).
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One consequence of this is visible when we analyze the ideological composition of the PS electorate through time: while the successful bids for power of the Socialists have always entailed the ability to attract the strategic vote of part of the leftist electorate, their passage through government was always followed by a desertion of segments of that same electorate to the parties in the left (Gómez Fortes, 2007) . In some cases -1999, for instance good economic performance and the corresponding afflux of centrist voters seems to have been enough to compensate such losses. However, ceteris paribus, as an incumbent party, the PS seems to be more affected by desertions of leftist voters than the PSD is affected by desertions of rightists. Thus, the second variable in our model is a dummy variable with value 1 when the incumbent was the PS: we expect a negative sign, representing the structural punishment endured by the Socialists after incumbency that follows from this particular structure of party competition.
Second, we take into account the semi-presidential nature of the Portuguese government and the particular role played by the president in the political system.
Unlike what occurs in the French case, where the president is the de facto head of the parliamentary majority (Thiébault, 2003) , or in established cases of "presidentparliamentarism" (Shugart, 2006 ), Portugal's brand of semi-presidential government has (with the exception of a brief stint from 1978 to 1979 of three short-lived cabinets 7 In 1985, the short-lived Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD), generally perceived to be to the left of the PS, was also arguably also the recipient of defections from the PS.
of "presidential initiative") never placed the popularly elected President in control of executive power. However, Portuguese presidents have also typically enjoyed and exerted more powers than their counterparts in other semi-presidential systems such as Ireland, Austria, or Iceland, where candidates tend to be recruited among minor party figures or "political outsiders" and elected presidents tend to play a mostly ceremonial and symbolic role (Kristinsson, 1999; Müller, 1999) . Instead, Portuguese presidents as well their counterparts in many Eastern European semi-presidential systems occupy somewhat of a middle ground in terms of presidential intervention in politics in comparison with those two extremes (Neto, 2003) . Even after a reduction of powers obtained through a 1982 constitutional amendment, Portuguese presidents can dissolve parliament, refer bills for constitutional review, and veto legislation. And although vetoes can be overridden by a parliamentary majority and constitutional referrals are of uncertain efficacy as veto-points, the public visibility brought to bear on government policies in this way can entail political costs that provide presidents with some leverage vis-à-vis governments, and can even be used in "wars of attrition" against them in situation of premier-presidential conflicts (Magalhães, 2007) .
Such conflicts have, in fact, happened recurrently not only in Portugal (Frain, 1995) but also in several Eastern European semi-presidential systems (Baylis, 1996; Protsyk, 2005 and . We expect them to entail important electoral consequences for incumbent parties. Elected by majority run-off systems, presidents obtain shares of the vote typically larger than that of any single party in a proportional representation system. The popular legitimacy derived from this provides not only justification for enhanced intervention in politics (Duverger, 1980; Protsyk, 2005) , but also an initial reservoir of support that, in cases of conflict with governments, is only slowly extinguished: as they lack formal executive powers and tend to be seen as "above" everyday politics, presidents' opposition to incumbent prime ministers tends to be perceived benevolently by more voters than those who would support the actions of a purely partisan political actor.
Thus, we argue that one crucial variable explaining the electoral performance of incumbent parties is the existence of such open and public conflicts between presidents and prime-ministers. Several Portuguese elections were held following such periods : the 1979, 1980, 1983 and 1985 elections, a protracted period of terse relations between Ramalho Eanes and the several centre-right and centre-left governments (Bruneau and Macleod, 1986) ; the 1995 elections, following the conflict between Mário Soares and the PSD majority government (Corkill, 1996) ; and the 2005 elections, following the dissolution of parliament and consequent fall of the centre-right coalition formed by the PSD and the smaller rightist CDS-Popular Party (Salgado, 2007) . We thus created a simple dummy variable, coded 1 for those elections, and expect it to have a negative sign: incumbents are likely to be punished in elections that follow periods of premierpresidential conflict.
In short, then, we propose a simple forecast model for the Portuguese general elections:
where VOTE is the percentage of the vote for the incumbent party in legislative elections in relation to all valid, null and blank votes; GROWTH is the non-linear monotonic transformation of the yearly GDP growth rate described before with a lag of two-quarters; SOCINC is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the incumbent was the Socialist Party; CONFLICT is another dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985 and 2005 elections; and u is a random shock. 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985 and 2005 . In these cases, we considered the vote for the largest party in the coalition, in all cases clearly either the PS or the PSD. future election, the forecast will be off by some 2.9 points.
Model estimation and evaluation

The data
Out-of-sample performance
We recognize that inference based on such a small sample may be difficult to rely on.
One can argue that the lack of degrees of freedom may cause one observation to have a huge impact on the final results, meaning that effects of an outlier are not washed way by a big sample. Therefore, in order to increase the reliability of our results, we perform a more demanding analysis and examine the "out-of-sample" forecasts: excluding each election at a time, we re-estimate the model with the remaining observations. Then we check if the estimated coefficients change in a significant way and, of course, how the model forecasts the omitted observation.
In all these re-estimated models, the signs of the coefficients never changed, and percentage points, and the grand mean reaches 3 points (Magalhães, 2005) .
Interestingly, both the lowest and highest out-of-sample forecast errors committed by our model are below those of the polls, and the mean for those five elections between 1991 and 2005 is, precisely, of 3 percentage points. And this was obtained, note, without including in the model any variables measuring vote intentions and government popularity: just an economic growth indicator measured two quarters before the election and dummies capturing which was the incumbent party and whether elections took place following a politically conflictual relation between the president and the cabinet.
Is the small sample a big problem?
There are two main consequences of a small sample size. The first one is large standard errors, which lead to lower t-statistics, which can lead to incorrect non-rejections of the null hypothesis. The second one is the high sensibility of the estimators to small changes in the sample. Since all our estimated coefficients are highly statistically significant and, as explained before (when performing the out-of-sample forecast experiments), the estimated coefficients are quite insensible to small changes in the sample, this seems not to be a problem. Still, for robustness and to assess the severity of the problem, we used the condition index test (Belsley, 1991) .
The condition index test is based on a simple idea. If the sample size is too small X X ' will be a near singular matrix. In this case, at least one of the eigenvalues of the matrix X X ' will be close to zero. Therefore, close to zero eigenvalues suggest that the small sample size may be a problem. The test involves the following steps: (1) standardization of the explanatory variables to unit variance; 9 (2) computation of the eigenvalues of the standardized Given the results expressed in equation (2) 
Conclusion
Strong claims that models of election forecasting are really testing theories about electoral behaviour should probably be taken with a grain of salt. Such models rely exclusively on aggregate data, observations are few and the demands of parsimony in order to avoid overfitting can lead to poorly specified models. Furthermore, in our case, and in spite of our best efforts to keep endogenous variables away from the model, we cannot exclude the possibility that one of them premier-presidential conflict suffers from such a problem. For example, such conflicts may emerge from the perception that the incumbent is electorally vulnerable on account of some political and economic factor competence of the prime minister, other aspects of economic performance besides economic growth, and so on that is unaccounted for in the model. This does not necessarily detract from the model's predictive capacities, but does raise questions about its theoretical soundness. However, forecast models should probably not be seen as mere parlour games either. All attempts at explaining voting behaviour entail an implicit (even if sometimes unacknowledged) claim about prediction (Sanders, 2005) , elections, we hope to have called attention to the need to start paying more attention to the elements that seem to stabilize and anchor voting behaviour in Portugal, as well as in other new democracies. Finally, it is often forgotten that, with the "third wave" of democratization, semi-presidentialism has in fact become "the most prevalent system of government in Europe" (Neto and Strøm, 2006: 623) . Although semi-presidentialism is a very heterogeneous type of government, there are reasons to believe that, at least in some cases, the dynamics of premier-presidential relations play a crucial role in politics.
Portugal is clearly one of such cases, and it is unlikely that it represents a mere outlier. Table 2 
